Publications:
"Analog representations and their users". Synthese 193:3, 851-71 (2016). [penultimate draft]
Characterizing different kinds of representation is of fundamental importance to cognitive science, and one traditional way of doing so is in terms of the analog–digital distinction. Indeed the distinction is often appealed to in ways both narrow and broad. In this paper I argue that the analog–digital distinction does not apply to representational schemes but only to representational systems, where a representational system is constituted by a representational scheme and its user, and that whether a representational system is analog or non-analog depends on facts about that user. This aspect of the distinction has gone unnoticed, and I argue that the failure to notice it can be an impediment to scientific progress.
"Jerry Fodor and the representational theory of mind". In Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers, ed. Andrew Bailey. Bloomsbury (2014). [penultimate draft]
This is an overview of much of Fodor's work, including discussion of folk psychology and realism about the propositional attitudes, functionalism, the computational theory of mind, and the language of thought hypothesis.
"Mental magnitudes and increments of mental magnitudes". The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4:4, 675-703 (2013). [penultimate draft]
There is at present a lively debate in cognitive psychology concerning the origin of natural number concepts. At the center of this debate is the system of mental magnitudes, an innately given cognitive mechanism that represents cardinality and that performs a variety of arithmetical operations. Most participants in the debate argue that this system cannot be the sole source of natural number concepts, because they take it to represent cardinality approximately while natural number concepts are precise. In this paper, I argue that the claim that mental magnitudes represent cardinality approximately overlooks the distinction between a magnitude and the increments that compose to form that magnitude. While magnitudes do indeed represent cardinality approximately, they are composed of a precise number of increments. I argue further that learning the number words and the counting routine may allow one to mark in memory the number of increments that composed to form a magnitude, thereby creating a precise representation of cardinality.
"Rethinking the language of thought". (with Susan Schneider). Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 3:2, 153-62 (2012). [.pdf]
In this piece, we overview the language of thought (LOT) program, a currently influential theory of the computational nature of thought. We focus on LOT's stance on concepts, computation in the central system, and mental symbols. We emphasize certain longstanding problems arising for the LOT approach, suggesting resolutions to these problems. Many of the solutions involve departures from the standard LOT program, i.e., the LOT program as developed by Jerry Fodor. We close by identifying avenues for future work.
"The language of thought hypothesis". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, eds. James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (2009). [link]
This is an overview of the Language of Thought Hypothesis, the major arguments in its favor, and the major problems it faces.
"Analog and digital representation." Minds and Machines 18:3, 403-08 (2008). [penultimate draft]
In this paper, I argue for three claims. The first is that the difference between analog and digital representation lies in the format and not the medium of representation. The second is that whether a given system is analog or digital will sometimes depend on facts about the user of that system. The third is that the first two claims are implicit in Haugeland's (1998) account of the distinction.
"Analog representations and their users". Synthese 193:3, 851-71 (2016). [penultimate draft]
Characterizing different kinds of representation is of fundamental importance to cognitive science, and one traditional way of doing so is in terms of the analog–digital distinction. Indeed the distinction is often appealed to in ways both narrow and broad. In this paper I argue that the analog–digital distinction does not apply to representational schemes but only to representational systems, where a representational system is constituted by a representational scheme and its user, and that whether a representational system is analog or non-analog depends on facts about that user. This aspect of the distinction has gone unnoticed, and I argue that the failure to notice it can be an impediment to scientific progress.
"Jerry Fodor and the representational theory of mind". In Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers, ed. Andrew Bailey. Bloomsbury (2014). [penultimate draft]
This is an overview of much of Fodor's work, including discussion of folk psychology and realism about the propositional attitudes, functionalism, the computational theory of mind, and the language of thought hypothesis.
"Mental magnitudes and increments of mental magnitudes". The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4:4, 675-703 (2013). [penultimate draft]
There is at present a lively debate in cognitive psychology concerning the origin of natural number concepts. At the center of this debate is the system of mental magnitudes, an innately given cognitive mechanism that represents cardinality and that performs a variety of arithmetical operations. Most participants in the debate argue that this system cannot be the sole source of natural number concepts, because they take it to represent cardinality approximately while natural number concepts are precise. In this paper, I argue that the claim that mental magnitudes represent cardinality approximately overlooks the distinction between a magnitude and the increments that compose to form that magnitude. While magnitudes do indeed represent cardinality approximately, they are composed of a precise number of increments. I argue further that learning the number words and the counting routine may allow one to mark in memory the number of increments that composed to form a magnitude, thereby creating a precise representation of cardinality.
"Rethinking the language of thought". (with Susan Schneider). Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 3:2, 153-62 (2012). [.pdf]
In this piece, we overview the language of thought (LOT) program, a currently influential theory of the computational nature of thought. We focus on LOT's stance on concepts, computation in the central system, and mental symbols. We emphasize certain longstanding problems arising for the LOT approach, suggesting resolutions to these problems. Many of the solutions involve departures from the standard LOT program, i.e., the LOT program as developed by Jerry Fodor. We close by identifying avenues for future work.
"The language of thought hypothesis". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, eds. James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (2009). [link]
This is an overview of the Language of Thought Hypothesis, the major arguments in its favor, and the major problems it faces.
"Analog and digital representation." Minds and Machines 18:3, 403-08 (2008). [penultimate draft]
In this paper, I argue for three claims. The first is that the difference between analog and digital representation lies in the format and not the medium of representation. The second is that whether a given system is analog or digital will sometimes depend on facts about the user of that system. The third is that the first two claims are implicit in Haugeland's (1998) account of the distinction.